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ABSTRACT
Since South Korea began its path toward industrialization after
the Korean War, chaebol firms—conglomerates led by a singlefamily head, characterized by numerous affiliates and subsidiaries
spanning several industries—have driven Korean economic
development. Bolstered by support from the Korean government,
these firms operated unchecked until the Asian Financial Crisis drew
international attention on the inefficiencies and abuses of power that
surrounded chaebol firms. Since the Crisis, the Korean government
has endeavored to reform Korean corporate law and place greater
checks on the chaebol leaders’ abuses of power. These attempts have
been largely unsuccessful, however, because the Korean business and
political elite use the rigid and ever-present influences of
Confucianism to perpetuate unbalanced societal power structures
and entrench their positions in Korean society. To achieve
substantive change, rather than pushing back against Confucian
ideals, policymakers must utilize traditional values to promote
stricter corporate governance standards and urge managerial
officers in companies to internalize these changes and encourage a
similar shift in thought throughout their staff.
I.

INTRODUCTION

South Korea today stands as a country at the forefront of
technological innovation1 and economic strength2—yet this status
was not easily achieved and remains inhibited by the many
inefficiencies that plague the Korean economic system. Under this

1. See, e.g., John McKenna, South Korea and Sweden are the Most Innovative Countries
ECONOMIC
FORUM
(Feb.
6,
2018),
in
the
World,
WORLD
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/south-korea-and-sweden-are-the-mostinnovative-countries-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/QQ7A-6XV5] (noting that South
Korean companies filed the most patents in 2017).
2. Best Countries for Business 2018: South Korea, FORBES (Dec. 2018),
forbes.com/places/south-korea/ [https://perma.cc/DZ3H-KHK8] (identifying South
Korea as the sixteenth best country for business in 2018).

158

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1

veneer of success lies the chaebol system, a conglomerate-based
corporate structure which serves as the foundation of Korea’s
economy.3 Despite having lost strength over the decades since the
Asian Financial Crisis,4 it remains at the heart of the Korean
economic system and serves to uplift certain families and social
circles at the expense of the economic health of the nation as a
whole.5 This Note explores how the chaebol system came into
existence, how it has persisted despite reform efforts, and how it
may be modified to limit its abuses and produce positive effects for
Korean society. It argues that Korean customs must support any
attempted statutory reform to create meaningful improvements in
Korea’s corporate governance system.
Part II introduces the history of South Korea’s economic
development, driven in large part by Japanese colonization and
subsequent American influence. Part III describes the effect that
traditional Korean culture has had on Korea’s economic growth
and in the development of Korean corporate law. While this culture
can positively impact society, the chaebol families have historically
exploited such culture to aggrandize and entrench themselves
among Korea’s political and economic elite. Korean culture should
instead encourage concepts of sound corporate governance that
conforms with the traditional Korean conception of the role of
business and government. Part IV discusses the various factors
that have contributed to or inhibited the reform of Korean
corporate governance. Part V identifies some reform measures
that policymakers have successfully implemented into Korean
law—often only formally, while rarely implemented in practice.
Part VI details the current status of the chaebol firms after the
passage of these reform measures. Part VII recommends further

3. For further details, see infra Section II.B.
4. See, e.g., Ellen J. Shin, The International Monetary Fund: Is It the Right or Wrong
Prescription for Korea?, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 597 (1999) (discussing IMFmandated reforms to Korean corporate governance that limit the power of the chaebol
families); Craig Ehrlich & Dae-Seob Kang, U.S. Style Corporate Governance in Korea’s
Largest Companies, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Ehrlich & Kang, U.S. Style
Corporate Governance] (discussing measures that give Korean boards greater influence
and independence from the chaebol families).
5. See generally Christopher Hale, Addressing the Incentive for Expropriation Within
Business Groups: The Case of the Korean Chaebol, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2006) (discussing
how chaebol firms can expropriate resources to the detriment of the conglomerate).

2021]

TAMING THE BEAST

159

action that could streamline reform efforts, and potentially allow it
to be more effective in practice.
II. HISTORY
A.

The Beginning of a Miracle

In 1910, Japanese imperialism ended the centuries-old reign
of the Choson Dynasty6 on the Korean peninsula.7 Japan’s
colonization eventually ended in 1945 with its surrender in World
War II. However, the former colony’s recovery could not begin
until the end of the Korean War in 1953 after the conflict between
the United States and Russia divided the nation into two opposing
states.8 This left both North and South Korea destitute and scarred
from decades of war. As an agrarian society in the pre-colonial
period,9 and with most of the peninsula’s natural resources locked
away in North Korea,10 the newly-formed Republic of Korea lacked
the commerce, infrastructure, and resources to begin
industrialization.11
With the aid of the United States and under the military
dictatorship of Park Chung Hee, Korea began efforts toward
modernization in the 1960s.12 From its inception, Park’s
government was actively involved in the economic vitalization of
6. See Jingyuan Ma & Mel Marquis, Business Culture in East Asia and Implications for
Competition Law, 51 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 15 (2016) [hereinafter Ma & Marquis, Business
Culture].
7. See Robert J. Rhee, The Political Economy of Corporate Law and Governance:
American and Korean Rules under Different Endogenous Conditions and Forms of Capitalism,
55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 659 (2020).
8. See id.
9. See Mel Marquis & Jingyuan Ma, Confucian Bureaucracy and the Administrative
Enforcement of Competition Law in East Asia, 43 N.C.J. INT’L L. 1, 30 (2018).
10. The majority of mineral deposits on the Korean peninsula—including iron ore
and coal, upon which many newly industrializing countries rely for energy production—
are located in North Korea and completely inaccessible to South Korea. Bae-ho Hahn, North
BRITTANICA:
GEOGRAPHY
&
TRAVEL,
Korea,
ENCYC.
https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Korea/Resources-and-power
[https://perma.cc/K7DU-BHEX] (last visited Dec. 14, 2020). South Korea, in contrast, is
relatively poor in such resources, and in modern day is forced to import 99.3 percent of its
metals. New Solution to South Korea’s Natural Resources Scarcity, CURTIN UNIV. (Sept. 13,
2017),
https://news.curtin.edu.au/stories/new-solution-south-koreas-naturalresources-scarcity/ [https://perma.cc/QQV7-EER6].
11. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 659.
12. See id.
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the country. With an eye toward “export-oriented growth”13 in
“heavy and chemical industries,”14 the government selectively
supported certain entrepreneurs through preferential loans and
government-controlled bank financing.15 This strategy marked the
birth of what is now often referred to as the “Miracle on the Han
River”—a period of rapid economic growth spanning from the
1960s until the late 1990s.16 This period heralded South Korea’s
transformation from an impoverished, war-torn nation into what
is today the twelfth-largest economy in the world.17 Because of this
incredible growth, the public grew accustomed to accepting the
government’s economic strategies. The success of this model also
allowed policymakers to maintain their authority and legitimacy
among the Korean people well into the late 1990s and the twentyfirst century.18
B.

The Rise of the Chaebol

The Korean government’s economic plan during this period
centered on close involvement with family-owned firms. This
“entrepreneurial bureaucracy,” a system of quid pro quo
cooperation between companies and politicians, facilitated Korea’s
economic surge from the 1960s through the 1980s.19 As particular
family-run firms began to show signs of success,20 the government

13. Shin, supra note 4, at 602.
14. Bernard Black et al., Financial and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Project,
Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness
– Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic
of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 551 (2000).
15. See Boong-Kyu Lee, Don Quixote or Robin Hood?: Minority Shareholder Rights and
Corporate Governance in Korea, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 345, 349 (2002).
16. See Sang Beck Kim, Dangling the Carrot, Sharpening the Stick: How an Amnesty
Program and Qui Tam Actions Could Strengthen Korea’s Anti-Corruption Efforts, 36 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 235, 239 (2016) [hereinafter Kim, Dangling the Carrot].
17. The Top 20 Economies in the World, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/
[https://perma.cc/5EZQ-EKJJ].
18. See Marquis & Ma, supra note 9, at 42-44.
19. See id. at 43 (quoting Yong Hyo Cho & Young Sup Kim, The Cultural Roots of
Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy: The Case of Korea, 16 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 509, 509 (1993)).
20. See Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate
Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 195, 211 (2004) (“[T]he initial wealth of the
chaebols originated from the government sale of properties owned by Japanese colonizers
and of other resources to their founding families.”).
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stepped in and directed their growth through favorable loans.21
During Park’s reign, the state controlled the banks and ordered
them to provide these favored families with low-interest rate
loans.22 Even after Park’s assassination in 1979,23 the subsequent
democratization of the country in 1987,24 and the privatization of
banks, the government continued to encourage inexpensive loans
and the banks continued to comply, in part due to the widespread
belief that the government would rescue and support any failing
firms.25
These firms, known as the “chaebol” (meaning “financial
house”), became large conglomerates of related companies
spanning a broad range of industries. Chaebol firms are highly
centralized and autocratic, revolving around their respective
founders and families.26 While they are privately owned, they
remain directly connected to the state; in exchange for
“preferential policy loans, tax credits, subsidies … and even
bailouts when they got into financial trouble,”27 chaebol firms
followed the government’s instructions on industry expansion28
and offered political support in the form of bribes.29
C.

The Chaebol’s Role in the Asian Financial Crisis

As chaebol firms grew, so too did the belief that they had
become too big to fail. These firms were certain that the
government would step in should their financial positions become
overly precarious, and so they engaged in highly risky, profitoriented behavior.30 Their financial structures were based on large

21. See id. at 209-10.
22. See Ok-Rial Song, The Legacy of Controlling Minority Structure: A Kaleidoscope of
Corporate Governance Reform in Korean Chaebol, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 183, 190 (2002).
23. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 659.
24. See Licht, supra note 20, at 210.
25. See Joongi Kim, A Forensic Study of Daewoo’s Corporate Governance: Does
Responsibility for the Meltdown Solely Lie with the Chaebol and Korea?, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 273, 286 (2008) [hereinafter Kim, Daewoo].
26. Black et al., supra note 14, at 551.
27. Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 284.
28. See, e.g., Shin, supra note 4, at 602 (“[I]n the 1970s, the government ordered
Daewoo, a chaebol specializing in textiles, to enter the automotive industry”).
29. See, e.g., id. (providing examples of rampant bribery of politicians by heads of
chaebol firms).
30. See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 279.
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amounts of debt, rather than equity,31 and they had little regard for
widely accepted corporate governance systems like accounting
and financial discipline.32
In the 1970s, recognizing the growing dangers of the chaebol
firms, the government began its largely toothless attempts to curb
the control of chaebol founders by forcing the firms to list on stock
exchanges, thereby diluting their ownership stakes.33 Because of
the symbiotic relationship between the firms and bureaucrats,
however, the government also protected the founders from
ownership threats by limiting investors’ ability to acquire control,
and thereby also limiting their ability to influence the board of
directors and management.34 Thus even while the chaebol families’
shares were gradually diluted into minority interests, they
maintained control.
In the 1980s, the government continued its efforts by
preventing cross-held shares35 from exercising voting rights and
prohibiting majority cross-shareholding in another effort to curb
founders’ control.36 In response, chaebol firms began creating
affiliate companies with circular cross-ownership networks
amenable to political influence.37 Flagship firms—including
Daewoo and SK Telecom,38 which remain household names
today—and their affiliates became so entangled in these complex
networks that it became nearly impossible to discern the extent to
which these various firms were connected or which founder sat at

31. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 660-61. See also Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 280
(“[Daewoo’s] debt gearing in 1998 was allegedly as high as 2,000% or greater.”).
32. See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 285.
33. See id.
34. This was accomplished by capping any investor’s ownership stake (other than
the initial owner’s) at ten percent. See Jeong Seo, Who Will Control Frankenstein? The
Korean Chaebol’s Corporate Governance, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L L & COMP. L. 21, 43 (2006).
35. Crossholding occurs when one publicly traded company owns shares in its
parent, subsidiary, or affiliate. This structure can cause abuses in shareholder votes and
inaccurate valuation of a company’s security. See Will Kenton, Cross Holding, INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan.
29,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cross-holding.asp
[https://perma.cc/MS9N-88UV].
36. See Song, supra note 22, at 198-99.
37. See Ma & Marquis, Business Culture, supra note 6, at 21-27, 30. Direct lending
involves exchanging funds between related affiliates within a conglomerate, whereas bank
lending involves the loaning of funds from institutional lenders.
38. For discussion on these firms, see infra Section II.C and Section IV.B.
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the helm.39 Sometimes called an “octopus management”40
structure, affiliate “tentacles” stretched across industries and
surrounded the large chaebol “head.” Thus, chaebol firms were
able to circumvent the cross-ownership voting restrictions, as it
was impossible to determine which tentacles belonged to which
head.
Chaebol firms used these affiliate companies to access capital
at favorable terms41 and prop up the head or other affiliates via
direct lending.42 Through these related-party transactions,
stronger affiliates could support weaker ones and conceal financial
instability. Further, because the conglomerate existed in a web of
internal debt or payment guarantees, the collapse of one affiliate
had the potential to cause the cascading failures of others—and
perhaps even the entire conglomerate.43 Thus, even as chaebol
firms experienced low profitability due to rapid and ill-planned
expansion, they continued to perpetuate an image of stability
which, if not particularly convincing, was sufficient to give banks
plausible deniability as they continued issuing inexpensive loans.
The affiliates also served to further dilute the shares of the
controlling families, which retained control while increasing the
proportion of the affiliates’ equity stakes. This dilution allowed the
influence of the founders to remain minimal on paper as they
retained control of the conglomerate and effectively silenced the
voices of other minority investors.44 In one of the most glaring
examples of this structure, before its bankruptcy in 1999,45 the
founding family of the Daewoo conglomerate held only .04 percent
of the shares of a subsidiary, Daewoo Motors, yet controlled 94.5
percent of Daewoo Motors’ shares through ownership stakes by
other cross-held firms.46 This stark divide between ownership
39. For a detailed explanation on the shareholding structure, see generally Song,
supra note 22.
40. Julia Tonkovich, Changes in South Korea’s Legal Landscape: The Hermit Kingdom
Broadens Access for International Law Firms, 32 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 571, 573 (2001).
41. See Hale, supra note 5, at 13.
42. See Song, supra note 22, at 205.
43. For a detailed explanation of this relationship, see Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at
287-96.
44. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 5. In 2006, the “typical dominant family [held] less than
10% of the chaebol’s stock . . . [while] effectively retain[ing] control over all subsidiaries.”
Seo, supra note 34, at 32.
45. See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 292.
46. Hale, supra note 5, at 36.
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stake and control rights allowed the founder families to externalize
the risks of their enterprises onto outside shareholders while
retaining the benefits for themselves.47
As industrialization continued through the 1960s and 1970s,
Korea’s domestic savings could no longer keep up with the
rampant borrowing of the chaebol firms.48 In the spirit of
nationalism and rather than allow direct foreign investing, the
government facilitated the entry of foreign loans guaranteed by
state-owned banks.49 Not long after, foreign investors began
noticing the severe structural issues of the conglomerates and the
failure of the government to control them and rapidly withdrew
from the Korean market.50
As the exchange rate fell throughout Asia and Korea’s reserves
continued to deplete, the value of the Won51 crashed and the Asian
Financial Crisis devastated the South Korean economy. The
chaebols’ low profits left them unable to repay their loans to the
banks, which in turn were unable to repay their foreign debts.52
The cascading failures throughout the conglomerates came to light.
D.

Other Aggravating Factors

While the inefficiencies of the chaebol system certainly
contributed greatly to Korea’s devastating experience in the Asian
Financial Crisis, they were not the sole cause. Korean banks,
financial regulators, the judicial system, and public guardians also
neglected their monitoring roles over the chaebol firms. These
system-wide failures worked in concert to place South Korea on
precarious footing leading up to the Crisis.

47. See Seo, supra note 34, at 54.
48. See Abeer Khandker, Why is the South Korean Growth Experience Different? An
Analysis of the Differences Per Capita GDP between South Korea and South Asian Countries,
49 ECON. CHANGE RESTRUCTURING 41, 44 (2016).
49. See Licht, supra note 23, at 209.
50. See Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance
and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 61, 65 (1999)
[hereinafter Kim, Living with the IMF]. This lack of trust in Korean firms continues to this
day, as evidenced by the “Korea discount.” See infra Section VI.C.
51. The Won is Korea’s national currency. See Jason Fernando, Korean Won (KRW),
INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/forex/k/krwkorean-won.asp [https://perma.cc/A9NW-6YJB].
52. Black et al., supra note 14, at 553.
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1. Banks
Korean banks operated under the assumption that the
government would continuously prop up chaebol firms and helped
fund these firms through frequent preferential loans, even as the
corporate debt-to-equity ratio53 of the firms reached up to 500
percent.54 The banks did not engage in any sound corporate
governance practices—such as requiring transparent accounting
or monitoring borrower firms by placing representatives on their
boards—and instead simply followed the directions of
policymakers, who desired unfettered funding to chaebol firms to
pursue government-led initiatives.55 Ultimately, the banks failed to
serve the monitoring role often associated with banks in American
governance and exacerbated the effects of the crisis.
2. Financial Regulators
Korean financial regulators were similarly derelict in their
monitoring duties. They failed to establish compliance regulations
that would ensure transparency and accountability in firms or
bring their concerns to the government. One agency, the Korean
Fair Trade Commission, flagged the instability of the chaebol firms,
but could not garner enough political support to monitor the firms
and control their reckless expansion.56
3. The Judicial System
Even if financial regulators had pursued legal action against
firms with poor corporate governance, there likely would have
been little resulting enforcement as the Korean judiciary was still
inexperienced and largely ineffective. Several forces maintained a
“tacit policy of soft enforcement”57 and kept the judicial system
from pursuing real action against wrongdoers. These forces
53. Generally, a high debt-to-equity ratio signals higher risk to investors because it
indicates that a company is financed largely through borrowing. See Jean Folger, What Is
Considered a High Debt-to-Equity Ratio, INVESTOPEDIA (May 1, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/063014/what-considered-highdebttoequity-ratio-and-what-does-it-say-about-company.asp [https://perma.cc/V5VZMM39].
54. Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 309.
55. See id. at 308-09.
56. See id. at 329.
57. Id. at 333.
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included Korea’s culture of leniency, the need for economic
expansion, inexperienced legal officers, and political pressures
exerted on judges. Additionally, many members of the judiciary
feared ruining the reputations of the chaebol founders through
punishment; even in the 1990s, as chaebol performance grew
increasingly risky,58 the nation still viewed the founders as an
overall benefit to the economy and there was a deep reluctance to
hamper this newfound economic growth.59
4. Gatekeepers and Other Public Guardians
Finally, other public sector guardians meant to curb chaebol
firms’ influence failed to take proper action. External auditors,
intended to ensure transparency and responsibility in the firms’
spending, neither possessed nor enforced the necessary legal
might to act as a check on founder families. Like the banks, these
auditors believed the government would serve as a safety net for
the firms; additionally, the auditors depended on the chaebol firms
for business, prompting them to overlook any accounting
violations they found.60
Credit agencies and securities analysts simply disregarded the
firms’ failures even until 1998 and 1999—well after the Asian
Financial Crisis had revealed the untenability of the chaebol
system—likely due to their interest in Korea’s unfettered
economic growth.61 Similarly, the Korean media published little
about the dangers of the system. There existed a purposeful
ignorance among investigative journalists, fueled by a combination
of concerns for the reputations of the chaebol firms as well as
undue influence from the firms themselves,62 as many newspapers
were owned by affiliates of the chaebol families.63

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See generally id.
See id. at 333-39.
See id. at 316-20.
See id. at 320-25.
Black et al., supra note 14, at 552.
See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 336.
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III. THE OMNIPRESENT IMPACT OF KOREAN CULTURE AND ITS
DETERMINANTS
Culture is present at all levels of society and is ingrained in
social values, customs, and ways of thought—and by extension, the
way a society undertakes and regulates business.64 As such, an
understanding of the culture in which the various reforms and
regulations were implemented in South Korea in the wake of the
Asian Financial Crisis is essential to an analysis of these reforms
This culture has historically shaped Korean corporate governance
and the application of rules post-Asian Financial Crisis. This Part
explores how Confucianism, an ancient Chinese system of thought
and behavior, informs Korean culture, and how it has encouraged
corruption among chaebol firms and passivity among the general
Korean public.
A.

Confucianism

Confucianism, a philosophy dictating the ideal social structure
and ethics,65 rests at the core of Korean culture. As the most
ethnically homogenous country in the world, Korean culture
remains traditional and pervasive throughout all levels of Korean
society and Confucianism is thought to influence it more deeply
than it does any other culture in the world.66 Scholars imported
Confucianism to Korea from China and it was the prevailing school
of thought during the Choson Dynasty, which lasted from 1392
until Korea’s colonization—over 500 years of entrenchment. The
social structure it contemplates was developed around a
paternalistic, hierarchical model, where the needs of the
community superseded the needs of any individual and elites were
expected to care for and be respected by the masses as a composite
father figure.67 Emphasizing collectivism, the individual’s part in
society was to follow “proper rituals” and pursue harmony in his
64. See Ma & Marquis, Business Culture, supra note 6, at 3-6; see also Licht, supra note
20, at 226 (“Accounting is a social activity. It rests on continual judgments and decision
making. In certain cases, accounting may involve ethical issues (especially in auditing
activities). International accounting scholars agree that culture is a major factor among
those that affect national account systems, including rules, practices, and institutions.”).
SOCIETY,
65. See
Judith
A.
Berling,
Confucianism,
ASIA
https://asiasociety.org/education/confucianism [https://perma.cc/8TEY-U9KF].
66. See Licht, supra note 20, at 215.
67. See Licht, supra note 20, at 215, 219-20.
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private actions.68 These ideals were gradually embedded into all of
Korean society, “dominating the ideological system … and
affect[ing] the country’s politics, economy, culture, and
education.”69
1. Education
Confucian values were perpetuated and strengthened by
Korea’s civil service examination system, through which
scholars—usually from upper-class families—became elite
bureaucrats based on performance on one annual test.70 Success
on the exam was based on the scholar’s knowledge and acceptance
of Confucian teachings. Thus, civil servants tended to come from
the same educational and social backgrounds and espoused similar
ideals.71 Although this exam no longer exists in an identical form
today, the Korean education system continues to evince a similar
reliance on test scores72 and rote memorization73 that
characterized the Choson Dynasty.
2. Social Ties
The traditional Confucian view of the family does not end at
the nuclear family unit, or even at the extended family. Instead,
Koreans view the family as extending to one’s entire clan,74 as well
as to social groups such as hometowns and school classes (from
elementary school through college).75 These ties demarcate
insiders and outsiders and act as the foundations of trust between
Korean individuals.76 They are often used as justifications for the
exchange of favors, to facilitate the sharing of valuable information,
68. Ma & Marquis, Business Culture, supra note 6, at 9.
69. See id. at 15.
70. See Marquis & Ma, supra note 9, at 16-19, 30.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 57.
73. See Jingyuan Ma & Mel Marquis, Corporate Culture and Competition Compliance in
East Asia, 15 S.C.J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 91 (2018) [hereinafter Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture].
74. This concept reaches beyond the simple extended family, which would include
aunts, uncles, and cousins, to encompass the far-reaching family tree—for example
including cousins several times removed. See Licht, supra note 20, at 224.
75. See Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 49-75 (identifying this
concept as “yongo”); Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 305 (“[H]igh school ties constitute a
powerful bond that often forms the basis of a lifelong, vertical social relationship.”).
76. See Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 49-50.
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and to obtain career positions and advancements.77 The
relationships within these groups are strictly hierarchical, based
on seniority in class, age, or social status,78 and span across all
sectors, from the media, to business communities, politics, and
academia.
3. Government
Confucian thought also shapes the Korean view on the
government’s role in society and in the economy. The
government’s participation is seen as “not only necessary, but
desirable for the development of a market economy.”79 Political
leaders are expected to act wisely and benevolently for the benefit
of the entire country, much like a father is expected to act for the
benefit of his family in Confucian tradition.80 In an ideal Confucian
society, these leaders would recognize the gravity of their power
and influence and wield it responsibly and morally for the
advancement of the whole community.
This perspective shapes how legislators approach
competition law; they consider it a tool through which the
government can pursue a particular economic plan in
collaboration with industries. They rely on business leaders for
advice and hold regular consultation meetings. Although the
government remains the head of much of the economic agenda,
business groups can influence compliance law and resultant
compromises are frequent.81 Additionally, because many of these
business representatives and government policymakers come
from a pool of individuals cultivated in the same Confucian
education and testing system, they often have little diversity of
experience or background, creating a homogenous groupthink
focused on singular interests.82
Confucianism remains similarly prevalent in the enforcement
of law. It teaches that, through proper moral education, individuals
will follow laws simply because doing so is virtuous.83 The role of
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id.
See id. at 50.
Marquis & Ma, supra note 9, at 48 (internal quotations omitted).
See Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 42-44.
See Marquis & Ma, supra note 9, at 52.
See id.
See id. at 7-11.
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punishments via legal rules was seen more as a deterrent and less
important in application, and litigation—bringing private disputes
into the public eye—was seen as particularly immoral and
shameful. As such, Confucian-educated judges discouraged
litigation, which would draw attention to scandals and damage the
reputations of the firms involved; they instead encouraged private
resolution through mediation.84
4. Business
Together with the need for economic growth and Korea’s
strong nationalism,85 the Confucian tradition was both the cultural
and ideological base for the country’s economic development in
the 1960s and 1970s. The idea and language of the family were
extended to the business world, applying to relationships both
within companies as well as between firms.86 These ideals
entrenched traditional power structures and impeded the efficacy
of corporate governance reform.
A conglomerate consisting of a chaebol firm and its affiliates
is operated based on a model of paternalistic leadership. Business
meetings are dominated by senior managers, who often come from
the same social circles and backgrounds, while junior managers
often have few opportunities to offer suggestions or new ideas.87
The family ownership structure of the firm results in upper-level
positions often being filled by the chaebol founder’s family
members,88 rather than outsiders who may potentially be more
qualified or offer innovative ideas born of diverse backgrounds. As
a result of this hiring mechanism, family firms are rife with
performance issues and internal power struggles, evidenced by
their high CEO turnover rate (which is three times higher than that
of non-family firms).89

84. See id. at 10.
85. See infra Section III.C.
86. See Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 34-35 (“[E]xpressions such
as parent company and daughter company are also found in many other parts of the world,
but there may be somewhat deeper psychological associations in countries where . . . the
company often assumes a family-like role.”).
87. See id. at 43-44.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 47.
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This ownership structure, combined with the government’s
perception of its role in corporate governance, militates against the
enforcement of governance laws imported from other
countries90—namely, the United States, Japan, and Germany.91
Although Korean statutes might be geared toward monitoring and
compliance, the application of the laws reflects the network of
interdependent relationships between the business and political
worlds.92 Korea’s collectivist culture encourages harmony and
private resolution while discouraging outspoken criticism or harsh
enforcement.93 The homogenous backgrounds of political and
business leaders exacerbate this problem, as they are connected
through loyalty ties based on their hometowns or extended
families.94 Rather than attempting to mitigate any potential bias or
self-dealing that might arise as a result of these ties, business
leaders instead seek to strengthen them, for example, by
appointing retired government officials to their boards.95
Within both Korean management cohorts and boards,
Confucian culture stands in contrast with Western models of
corporate governance because the idea of the corporation as a
distinct entity or shareholders’ primacy does not exist in Korean
tradition. Rather than owing duties to the corporation or to
shareholders, managers instead feel they owe duties to the founder
families who placed them in their positions.96 “
When controlling persons97 dominate and one’s career
depends on patronage, the abstractions of the corporation as

90. See Ma & Marquis, Business Culture, supra note 6, at 5 (“[M]ost East Asian
countries have in recent years promulgated or amended their competition laws under the
influence of the U.S. or . . . the EU competition model.”).
91. See Licht, supra note 20, at 212 (identifying Germany as an influence insofar as
Korea imported Japanese corporate law, which was based on German corporate law).
92. For example, directors that are technically independent by statutory standards
still possess a great deal of loyalty to firm chairmen and to the maintenance of the status
quo. See Licht, supra note 20, at 223.
93. See Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 38.
94. See supra Section III.A.2.
95. See Ma & Marquis, Business Culture, supra note 6, at 31; Kim, Daewoo, supra note
25, at 303-04.
96. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 702.
97. Here, referring to chaebol founders and other high-ranking members of their
social circles.
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a separate and distinct entity and the aggregate interest of all
unaffiliated shareholders are merely textbook concepts.98

This loyalty, stemming from the small and closely-knit social and
professional circles in the upper echelons of Korean society, may
be most prevalent among older Koreans, who populate C-suites
and other senior positions in businesses.
B.

Corruption

Given the elite, interconnected networks that make up Korean
society, it may come as no surprise that Korea’s political and
business systems are rife with corruption.99 This problem can be
attributed to the combination of Confucian ideals, which
encouraged social cohesion through gift-giving, and the
government’s strategy of economic growth after the Korean
War.100 As the government facilitated the interdependencies
between policymakers, banks, and chaebol firms, it also
encouraged bribery as a byproduct.101 “The system that produced
Korea’s economic development eroded its own base.”102
Because most instances of corruption are never reported in
the first place,103 it is difficult to implement effective statutory
measures to combat them. Confucian traditions of loyalty and the
dependence on one’s social network for career advancements
make it extremely costly for potential whistleblowers to come
forward.104 Whistleblowing is considered “morally repugnant”
given the importance of group loyalty,105 and it is understandably
challenging to ask whistleblowers to report the very individuals
upon whom they rely for promotions. Instead, bribery and
fraudulent accounting are simply accepted as characteristics of the

98. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 703-04.
99. See Craig P. Ehrlich & Dae Seob Kang, Independence and Corruption in Korea, 16
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 1 (2002) [hereinafter Ehrlich & Kang, Independence and Corruption].
100. Andy Spalding, South Korea: An Anti-Corruption Tiger, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 18, 2018,
12:28 PM), https://fcpablog.com/2018/02/16/south-korea-an-anti-corruption-tiger/
[https://perma.cc/69PD-77JX]; Kim, Dangling the Carrot, supra note 16, at 239-42.
101. Ehrlich & Kang, Independence and Corruption, supra note 99, at 3.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 5-6.
104. See id. at 44.
105. Kim, Dangling the Carrot, supra note 16, at 251.
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Korean business culture.106 Even as laws are developed to
encourage whistleblowing and institute strict penalties for
participation in bribery,107 there remains little substantive change.
“Law cannot change a culture.”108
In Korea’s short democratic history, four Presidents have
been involved in public corruption scandals involving bribery by
leading chaebol firms.109 These high-profile cases of corruption
have not, however, changed the traditional idea of civil servants as
champions of the people and of the moral good. In fact, they may
have even further entrenched the idea that such personnel should
be educated in Confucian values and traditions,110 so as to preempt
such immoral behavior.
C.

Public Support for Chaebol Firms

Historically, Korean countrymen were expected to simply
respect the decisions of the bureaucratic elite and the monarch and
accepted their role as the caretakers of the general welfare as a
part of the Confucian social structure.111 Although the country has
modernized considerably throughout the past decades, this culture
of trust remains embedded in its centuries-long history.112 As a
result, Korean society has not accepted the ideas of enforcement
through private litigation and of the corporation as a legal
personhood that can have interests adverse to the general public.
General acceptance of the chaebol structure also stems in
large part from Korean nationalism. Koreans have long held a
powerful sense of nationalistic pride, bolstered by their country’s
historic struggles as a small nation trapped between two large
powers (China and Japan) and the suppression of Korean culture

106. See Ehrlich & Kang, Independence and Corruption, supra note 99, at 19 (“Any
investor or banker who cared to know could have asked a CPA and been told that there
was a tendency to accept white lies as a normal business practice.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
107. See infra Section V.A.
108. Id. at 5.
109. See Shin, supra note 4, at 603-02 (listing Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo); see
also Rhee, supra note 7, at 667 (listing Lee Myun-Bak and Park Geun-Hye).
110. See Marquis & Ma, supra note 9, at 41.
111. See id. at 11-14.
112. See supra Section III.A.
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during the Japanese occupation.113 It is based not only in antiimperialist sentiments,114 but also in the shared conception of
Korean ethnicity.115 This sentiment has continued into modern
day; South Koreans, for example, are known for the passionate
support of their national athletes.116 This nationalism may be
causing the reluctance to implement legislation that might provide
foreign investors the opportunity to pursue takeovers of Korean
flagship firms. To Korean citizens, a firm run by a Korean, even if
corrupt or inefficient, may be preferable to a foreigner-run efficient
firm.117 Thus, as a combined result of Confucian values and
persisting nationalism, many Koreans view the chaebol firms as
beneficial to the continued growth of the country, or at least find
them less objectionable than the alternative of foreign
ownership.118
IV. DRIVERS OF AND ROADBLOCKS TO REFORM
There have long been efforts to reform corporate governance
in South Korea, driven by a combination of foreign influence and
domestic activism. While many of these efforts have resulted in
some change, the convergence on foreign (namely, American)
standards has been largely formalistic. Due to the continued
influences of Korean culture, the government, firms, and citizens
113. See Erin Blakemore, How Japan Took Control of Korea, HISTORY (July 28, 2020),
https://www.history.com/news/japan-colonization-korea
[https://perma.cc/NTZ7JHSF].
114. See Gi-Wook Shin & Paul Yunsik Chang, The Politics of Nationalism in U.S.-Korean
Relations, 28 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 119, 121-22 (“Of great[] urgency was establishing the
Korean nation as a distinctive unit, safeguarding its sovereignty and promoting national
spirit and consciousness.”).
115. See id. at 121 (“[T]he Korean word, minjok, while most widely used for ‘nation,’
can easily refer to ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ as well.”).
116. Monica Kim, The Everyday Psychology of Nationalism, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/the-everyday-psychology-ofnationalism/284188/ [https://perma.cc/U6BD-8RB2].
117. See Hale, supra note 5, at 40-41 (“Considering the inroads that foreign hedge
funds have made in recent years . . . it is highly likely that the Korean public as a whole does
not want to see their flagship firms taken over by foreigners, regardless of the personal
views they hold on chaebol governance.”).
118. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 694 (“This set of private and public voting blocks[,
meaning the chaebol shareholders and the National Pension Service, Korea’s public
pension plan,] must be seen as a significant benefit among a consensus of Korean elites
and, implicitly, even the general populace in a country that has a strong national identity
and a collective sense of shared interest in the national economy.”).
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remain unwilling to embrace these reforms in order to create
substantive change.
A.

Foreign Influence

Foreign dissatisfaction has driven much of the corporate
governance reform in Korea. The greatest push came from the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) after it bailed out South
Korea in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis.119 Foreign stock
markets have also made an impact on the internal governance of
cross-listed Korean firms, as the foreign exchanges on which they
are listed forced the firms to adhere to their (often much stricter)
regulations.120
1. Regulatory Reform
Reform in South Korea has generally proceeded through the
importation of American corporate governance principles,121 like
fiduciary duties,122 into the Korean Commercial Code (“KCC”).
Koreans have also taken inspiration from Japan (and thereby from
Germany) in the original creation of the KCC,123 as well as from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and
from the IMF “best practices.”124 These changes were likely
motivated in part by the government’s understanding that the
adoption of internationally recognized governance codes would
signal to other countries that South Korea had “good corporate
governance,”125 thereby making Korean firms more attractive to
foreign investors and more competitive on foreign stock
exchanges.
While Korea reformed its statutes, it neglected126 to
implement those laws.127 The reforms did not change the
119. See Shin, supra note 4, at 604-07.
120. See Licht, supra note 20, at 199.
121. See Song, supra note 22, at 220.
122. See infra Section V.B.1.b.
123. See Licht, supra note 20, at 212 (“[T]he Korean Code mirrors the Japanese
Commercial Code of 1950.”).
124. See id. at 212-13.
125. Gen Goto et al., Diversity of Shareholder Stewardship in Asia: Faux Convergence,
53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829-30, 836 (2020).
126. These reforms include the creation of a derivative suit for non-controlling
shareholders and stricter anti-corruption measures. See infra Part V.
127. See id.
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underlying issues surrounding the chaebol structure or the
interdependence of the chaebol firms and the government.128
Additionally, the government simply lacked the capability—due to
a lack of expertise and training—to create systems of enforcement
for the new laws.129 The judiciary in particular was accustomed to
adjudicating social issues and therefore was ill-equipped in its
sudden new role as an arbiter in economic cases,130 even with the
guidance of statutes.
That is not to say that these new corporate governance
imports had no effect on Korean business. The reforms
successfully helped strengthen the Korean economy and made it
less vulnerable to shocks in domestic and foreign markets, reduced
the debt-to-equity ratio of chaebol firms in the aggregate by more
than 500 percent, and generally increased transparency and
profitability in chaebol firms.131 These victories, however,
remained small and were largely driven by post-scandal and postcrisis activism.132 After the initial sting of these events faded away,
the culture of government enforcement slipped back into
complacency.133
2. Cross-Listing
In some cases, cross-listing on foreign markets with stricter
compliance rules can serve as a substitute for effective domestic
corporate governance laws. The success of such a strategy depends
in large part on the “cultural distance” between the home country
and the foreign one.134 According to Amir Licht:135

128. See Song, supra note 22, at 221.
129. See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 336; Marquis & Ma, supra note 9, at 59-60.
See also supra Part II.
130. See Lee, supra note 15, at 350-51; Song, supra note 22, at 212.
131. Bang Nam Jeon, From the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis to the 2008-09 Global
Economic Crisis: Lessons From Korea’s Experience, 5 E. ASIA L. REV. 103, 130 (2010)
(discussing Korea’s strengthened ability to ride out the 08/09 recession).
132. Consider, for example, the reform following the Asian Financial Crisis, see id. at
127-30, or the reform following the ferry sinking in 2014. See infra Section V.A.
133. Stephen J. Choi & Kon Sik Kim, Establishing a New Stock Market for Shareholder
Value Oriented Firms in Korea, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 277, 286 (2002).
134. Licht, supra note 20, at 199.
135. Amir N. Licht earned his LL.M. and S.J.D. from Harvard Law School and studied
law and economics at Tel Aviv University. He currently teaches as a Professor of Law at
Harry Radzyner Law School in the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya.
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Cultural distance represents the sum of factors creating, on the
one hand, a need for knowledge, and on the other hand,
barriers to knowledge flow and hence for other flows between
the home and target countries . . . [B]asic concepts of corporate
governance—including accountability, self-dealing, and fair
and equitable treatment— . . . connote fundamentally
different things to Americans than to Koreans.136

As such, the efficacy of cross-listing on Western exchanges is
hampered by the wide cultural distance between Western
liberalism and Eastern Confucianism. While Korean firms might,
on paper, adhere to New York Stock Exchange regulations on
independent director minimums and accounting procedures, for
example, the actual implementation of these requirements will
vary significantly from the American implementation due to
cultural differences in interpretation.
B.

Domestic Activism

Change in Korean governance was not driven by foreign
influence alone; there existed important domestic actors who
rallied for the reform of Korean commercial law. Chief among them
was the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (“PSPD”),
a non-governmental organization that has since 1997 been
advocating for greater transparency and accountability in large
family firms.137 The organization is comprised largely of business
experts, including attorneys, accountants, and academics.138 Its
most notable contributions are derivative suits139 and aggressive
media campaigns against chaebol firms. Through high-profile
cases against firms like Samsung in 1999,140 the PSPD brought the

136. Licht, supra note 20, at 221-22, 223.
137. See Lee, supra note 15, at 354.
138. See id.
139. A suit brought against a director or officer by a shareholder representing the
corporation. See Shareholder Derivative Suit, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/shareholder_derivative_suit [https://perma.cc/6XC3ASBT] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
140. Five directors who sold Samsung Chemical shares at an unreasonably low price
after only one hour of discussion were found to breach their fiduciary duty of care and
were forced to compensate Samsung Electronics in the amount of 62.66 billion Won. See
Lee, supra note 15, at 364-70. An unaffiliated activist campaign also successfully resulted
in non-controlling shareholders adding directors onto the board of SK Telecom, a major
Korean chaebol. See Kim, Living with the IMF, supra note 50, at 71, 89.
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abuses of preferential treatment and poor transparency in family
firms into the public eye.141
More recently, President Moon Jae-In nominated Kim Sang-jo,
dubbed the “chaebol sniper,” as his top antitrust regulator. Kim is
famous for spearheading shareholder activist campaigns and
President Moon hoped he would work with the Korean Fair Trade
Commission “by beefing up investigation of conglomerates,
cracking down on unfair deals between chaebols and small and
medium-sized companies, and funneling contracts and orders to
affiliates of shareholders.”142 Moon and Kim hoped that these
improvements would help in their overall goal of improving
corporate governance and granting more power to shareholders
outside the chaebol families.143
V. REFORM MEASURES
A.

Anti-Corruption

Recognizing the deep connections between policymakers and
businesses, and the opportunities such connections offered for
bribery and fraud, the government set forth several anticorruption measures to help mitigate the influence of businesses
on government actions. These efforts began in 1998 following the
Asian Financial Crisis and have continued into modern day. The
Improper Solicitation and Graft Act, which specifically targets
bribery of public officials,144 is the most recent attempt to curb
Korean corruption. Inspired by the 2014 ferry incident145—which

141. See Seo, supra note 34, at 59.
142. Se Young Lee et al., South Korea Taps Chaebol Reform Activist as Antitrust Chief,
(May 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-antitrustnominat/south-korea-taps-chaebol-reform-activist-as-antitrust-chief-idUSKCN18D0U9
[https://perma.cc/UA67-K873].
143. Id. It remains to be seen, however, how successful their effort might be, as Kim
has faced backlash for his criticisms of the chaebol firms. See Hyun-woo Nam, FTC Chief
Under Fire for Anti-chaebol Remarks, KOREA TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2020/08/693_265290.html
[https://perma.cc/KVF3-5M83].
144. Robert Bowen, Laws Concerning Corruption in Korea, in ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: JOINT VENTURES § 17:13.93(2020), Westlaw ECKLICN-JV
§ 17:13.93.
145. See Spalding, supra note 100.
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investigators attributed to the corrupt enforcement of safety
regulations146—it was based largely on Western ideals.147
This Act imposes fines for “improper solicitation” of a wide
variety of professions, including public officials, journalists, and
members of non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”).148 The
statutes set out punishments for both the givers and receivers of
bribes.149 Additionally, public officials are required to report any
knowledge of bribery by another public official. 150 Employees of
financial institutions have a similar obligation—this is an
affirmative duty, and those covered under the statutes can be
penalized for failure to comply.151 Corporations can also be held
liable for negligence in supervising employees engaged in
bribery.152 The penalties for corruption offenses include both civil
and criminal sanctions.153
The inadequacies of these new laws, complemented by
Korean culture, limit their efficacy. In order to detect corruption
and enforce these statutes, government officials rely heavily on
whistleblowers.154 However, the latest anti-corruption statutes do
not provide sufficient protections or incentives for individuals to
come forward. Wrongdoers, despite the duty to self-report,155
rarely disclose instances of bribery.156 It is simply unrealistic to
believe that an individual giving or receiving a bribe would be
interested in following the mandates of the law, given that he is
actively in the process of breaking the law himself.157 The new Act
146. In 2014, a South Korean ferry sank, killing over 300 passengers, many of whom
were students. Authorities attributed the accident to multiple oversight failures, including
licensing of an illegally converted and modified ferry and failure of communication among
coast guards at the time of the incident. See South Korea Ferry ‘Sank Due to Negligence,
Corruption’, BBC (July 8, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28205785
[https://perma.cc/K5D6-BPWL].
147. See Ehrlich & Kang, Independence and Corruption, supra note 99, at 22-23.
148. See Lana Rask, How South Korea’s Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (Kim
Young-Ran Act) Can Help Protect US Trade Secrets, 8 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 208, 227
(2017).
149. See id.
150. See Kim, Dangling the Carrot, supra note 16, at 249.
151. See id. at 245, 249.
152. See Spalding, supra note 100.
153. Id.
154. See Kim, Dangling the Carrot, supra note 16, at 237.
155. See id. at 249.
156. See id. at 249-52.
157. See id. at 249.

180

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1

fails to guarantee whistleblowers anonymity except in cases where
they can prove a high risk of retaliation and that they or their
family members are in danger.158 There are also penalties for false
reporting, a lack of proper discovery laws to help a case survive a
motion to dismiss, and a low cap on monetary awards.159
Moreover, the law is also ineffective at enforcing self-reporting
because the penalty for failing to do so is lighter than the penalty
for getting caught for bribery.160
Although there does seem to be an improvement in awareness
of and compliance with changes in anti-corruption laws, 161 the
reforms remain largely ineffective in the face of the entrenched
culture of corruption in Korean business and politics. Korean
culture continues to view gifts as an integral part of social life, and
monetary or lavish gifts to a business partner, political superior, or
ally remain an everyday part of corporate and political life.162
Critics view efforts to limit gifts as being counter to Korean
tradition.163 Korea’s collectivist culture also places a premium on
group loyalty, and insiders remain reluctant to betray their
companies, even if not doing so means violating anti-corruption
law.164
B.

Internal Monitoring

The Crisis highlighted the spectacular lack of monitoring of
Korean businesses, as well as the dangers that such a lack of
monitoring can bring. Policymakers realized that firms had to be
held accountable to more than just shareholders.165 Thus, they
created extensive regulations meant to create substantial penalties
and to curb the inefficacies of boards of directors, managers, and
auditors of chaebol firms.166

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See id. at 250-51.
See id. at 250-51, 262-63.
See id. at 249.
See Kim, Dangling the Carrot, supra note 16, at 243-44.
See Rask, supra note 148, at 223.
TERRENCE F. MACLAREN & RALPH H. FOLSOM, ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: JOINT VENTURE § 17:13.93 (Robert Bowen ed., 2020).
164. See Kim, Dangling the Carrot, supra note 16, at 251.
165. See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 330.
166. See id.
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1. Board of Directors and Managers
a. Problems
Both the boards of directors and the senior management
teams of chaebol firms have historically been under the significant
influence of their respective founder families. The chairman’s
office (occupied by the head of the founder family) makes
appointments for management with little to no input by the
board167 and retains “absolute influence over the careers” of those
in management or on the management track.168 The management
culture within these firms remains highly authoritarian, with little
exchange of new ideas.169 In this way, the chairman’s office is able
to exercise control of all affiliates in the conglomerate, despite
lacking large ownership stakes in or direct control over the day-today operations of the affiliate firms.
The board of directors is similarly governed by the chairman’s
will even though, in most cases, the chairman is not officially seated
on the board.170 In fact, it is often the chairman himself—or the
president or another inside director who is loyal to the chairman—
who presides over board meetings.171 Ideas conflicting with the
chairman’s vision are quashed or entirely withheld; inside
directors have no interest in running afoul of the chairmen, and
independent directors172 often lack business expertise173 and
access to information about the corporation.174 Meetings lack

167. See Ehrlich & Kang, U.S. Style Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 22-23.
168. Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 297 (quoting Judgment of Nov. 29, 2002, 2001
No 2063 (Seoul High Court), at 80).
169. See Ehrlich & Kang, U.S. Style Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 21.
170. See Craig P. Ehrlich & Dae-Seob Kang, Corporate Governance Reform in Korea:
The Remaining Issues, 21 NO. 3 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 13, 23 (1999)
[hereinafter Ehrlich & Kang, Remaining Issues].
171. Jae Yeol Kwon, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance: A
Comparative Approach to the South Korean Statutory Scheme, 12 MINN. J. GLOB. TRADE 299,
326 (2003) [hereinafter Kwon, Internal Division].
172. An independent director is, generally speaking, one who is outside of the
organization. An inside director is someone from within the corporation or someone with
significant ties to the corporation. See James Chen, Independent Outside Director,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 4, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/independentoutside-director.asp [https://perma.cc/G9X9-TAJH].
173. These roles are often filled by academics, accountants, and retired officials. See
Black et al., supra note 14, at 557.
174. See id.
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active discussion175 or, in some cases, do not occur at all, with
meeting minutes drawn up after the fact based on directions from
the chairman’s office.176 Although by law, directors owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation, they rarely understand or appreciate
these duties because their violation rarely garners punishment.177
b. Reforms
Since the Asian Financial Crisis, policymakers have made
several reforms to the governance of Korean boards of directors.
These include the expansion of fiduciary duties and an increase in
the required number of independent directors. Some of the
reforms implemented have, in fact, been ostensibly followed,178 but
substantively, their intentions have not been fulfilled.
Fiduciary duties require a director to act as a “good manager”
and operate with a standard of care higher than that with which
one would conduct his own business (broadly understood as a
corollary to the American duty of loyalty, though it lacks the
fairness requirement of its American counterpart).179 Directors
can be held liable for poor business decisions or for failure to fulfill
affirmative statutory obligations.180 While this reform is meant to
encourage accountability and to proscribe directors from
externalizing the costs of bad business judgment onto the public, it
also causes directors to be extremely risk-averse, thereby
potentially hampering profitability.181 Additionally, shareholders
rarely bring suits for violation of fiduciary duties due to the
inaccessibility182 of derivative lawsuits in South Korea, thus
impeding any juristic development of the director’s duty of loyalty
of the kind that has been seen in American law. 183 Similarly, the
175. See id.
176. See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 302.
177. See id. at 302-04.
178. See Ehrlich & Kang, U.S. Style Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 61
(“[C]hairmen are no longer visibly directing day-to-day affairs of groups and appear to be
letting managers do their jobs.” (emphasis added)).
179. See Jae Yeol Kwon, Corporate Governance from a Comparative Perspective:
Specific Applications of the Duty of Loyalty in Korea, 22 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 15, 18 (2004)
[hereinafter “Kwon, Corporate Governance”].
180. See generally id.
181. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 670-72.
182. See infra Section V.C.1.b.iii.
183. This is not for a lack of legislation, but rather a lack of sufficient motivation. See
Song, supra note 22, at 213-14; infra Section V.B.iii.c.
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government’s extension of liability under the KCC to a person who
“us[es] his/her influence over the company . . . or [who] exerts de
facto influence on important matters related to the management of
the listed company” (i.e., the chairman) makes him a de facto
director and thereby subjects him to the same liabilities as an
ordinary director.184 However, determinations of what constitutes
“de facto influence” are questions of fact that require a
sophisticated judiciary and access to courts.185
The requirement for a three-to-one ratio of inside to
independent directors on the boards of firms listed on the Korean
Stock Exchange (“KSE”)186 has been similarly followed only
superficially. The definition of “independent” in the KCC has not
been sufficiently restrictive to prevent controlling shareholders
from filling boards with members of their social circles.187 Most socalled independent directors remain strongly allied to the founding
families.188 Therefore, any other rights given to the board—such as
appraisal rights for dissenters in mergers or sales189 or veto rights
of related-party transactions190—are largely unused and
functionally irrelevant, as the board remains full of those loyal to
the chaebol family.
Furthermore, even when truly both professionally and
socially independent, outside directors often find themselves
socially unable to express conflicting ideas. “In East Asia, where
conformity is the norm, standing out and speaking one’s mind . . .
are not viewed positively.”191 Furthermore, a truly independent
director may be seen as a pariah, standing apart from the social
groups that beget trust and loyalty. Other members of the board
may distrust and withhold information from such a director,
making it difficult for him to fulfill his monitoring duties.192 Thus,
as long as the chaebol families do not value independent

184. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 672-73 (internal quotations omitted; citing
COMMERCIAL ACT, art. 542-548(2) (Korea Legislation Research Institute 2019) (S. Kor.)).
185. See id.
186. See Kim, Living with the IMF, supra note 50, at 74.
187. See Licht, supra note 20, at 224-25.
188. See Ehrlich & Kang, U.S. Style Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 60.
189. See Kim, Living with the IMF, supra note 50, at 72.
190. See Choi & Kim, supra note 133, at 283.
191. Licht, supra note 20, at 224.
192. Id. at 225.
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management and directors, any reforms simply mandating further
independence are unlikely to create substantive change.
2. Audit Committee
a. Problems
Transparency problems traditionally beset chaebol firms;
both internal accountants and external auditors have historically
failed to detect or actively overlooked warning signs of financial
irregularities.193 The KCC also did not require consolidated
financial statements until after 1997,194 thus allowing a single asset
to be sold to multiple entities in a conglomerate and generate
artificial sales.195 These internal transactions allowed all affiliates
of a firm to show exaggerated company value, while more stable
affiliates would “rescue” weaker ones by buying assets at high
above-market prices.196 Fake subsidiaries were also often used to
circumvent accounting rules.197 Generally speaking, the financials
of conglomerates were often locked in a black box of irresponsible
accounting and auditing, leaving the public largely unaware of
their precarious financial situations.
b. Reforms
After the Asian Financial Crisis, the statutory provision
requiring a firm to have an auditor198 was replaced by an option to
have either an external auditor or an audit committee,199 meant to
act as an “independent watchdog” over the firm’s financials and act
in the interests of shareholders and creditors.200 The auditor or
committee is subject to the same duty of care as directors in
193. See Ehrlich & Kang, Remaining Issues, supra note 170, at 4.
194. See Choi & Kim, supra note 133, at 283.
195. See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 288.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 294.
198. This role was similar in form to the Japanese statutory auditor insofar as an
auditor is mandated by the Commercial Code, must attend board meetings, and acts as a
check on management and as a monitor over directors. See Kwon, Internal Division, supra
note 171, at 330-31.
199. Under the KCC, a corporation may establish an audit committee instead of
utilizing statutory auditors. Regardless of what type of auditor a company uses, the entity
works as an adversary to management and a monitor of directors. See id.
200. Id. at 331.
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overseeing a corporation201 and is subject to liability for failure to
perform its duties.202 To safeguard their independence, auditors
have a tenure of three years203 and there are restrictions on the
influence shareholders can exert on the election of an audit
committee. 204 To further curb shareholder abuse, auditors also
possess the legal power to call an extraordinary shareholder’s
meeting should they notice any director impropriety.205
Ostensibly, legislators have brought general Korean
accounting standards into “substantial compliance” with the
International Accounting Standards.206 Chaebol firms are now held
accountable by the Financial Services Commission,207 to which
they must provide consolidated financial statements to prevent the
previously discussed related party transactions,208 have increased
disclosure requirements, and are subject to heightened penalties
for fraudulent audit reports.209 Yet statutory law cannot be
removed from the cultural context in which it is ratified.210 Socalled independent auditors experience many of the same issues
faced by boards of directors.211 Most independent committee
members are independent only on paper and remain socially tied
with chairmen.212 They are also generally inexperienced and may
bristle at incurring social backlash as a consequence of reporting
financial inconsistencies.213 Further complicating matters is that
what may be considered misrepresentation, fraud, or insider
trading varies across cultures. Certain conduct which may be a

201. See id. at 332.
202. See id. at 335.
203. See Kim, Living with the IMF, supra note 50, at 72.
204. See Kwon, Internal Division, supra note 171, at 332 (“[A]ny shareholder owning
more than three percent of the outstanding voting shares is not allowed to exercise his
vote on his shares in excess of the three percent in the election of statutory auditors.”).
205. See Kim, Living with the IMF, supra note 50, at 72.
206. Choi & Kim, supra note 133, at 283.
FED’N
ACCTS.,
https://www.ifac.org/about207. See
Korea,
INT’L
ifac/membership/country/korea [https://perma.cc/VQ5J-LZ7T] (last visited May 4,
2021).
208. See Choi & Kim, supra note 133, at 283.
209. Black et al., supra note 14, at 558.
210. See Licht, supra note 20, at 226.
211. See supra Section V.B.1.
212. See Licht, supra note 20, at 214.
213. Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 91.
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material violation under US law may not be deemed as such under
identical statutes in South Korea.214
C.

External Monitoring

1. Minority Shareholders
a. Problem
Minority shareholders are also unable to properly perform
their monitoring function215 due to the vast control that the
chaebol families exercise over their conglomerates. Concentrated
ownership can, in some instances, be useful (namely to reduce
agency costs). In concentrated minority ownership, however, “the
agency benefits derived from concentrated ownership are often
outweighed by the private benefits of control reaped by the
controllers.”216
As previously discussed, the controlling minority structure
creates a sharp divide between cash-flow rights and voting rights,
as the control bloc holds a tiny percentage of ownership stake yet
wields all the control.217 Additionally, the chaebol families may
hold up to sixty subsidiary or affiliate firms, while sales remain
concentrated in a few core subsidiaries.218 These subsidiaries span
across industries through both horizontal and vertical
diversification.219
As such, rather than consider what might be best for the firm
or other shareholders (such as the distribution of dividends), the
214. Cf. Licht, supra note 20, at 228-29 (discussing the differences in materiality
estimates among European accounting firms).
215. Minority shareholders are often seen as monitors of controlling shareholders,
directors, and management due to the availability of the derivative suit. The idea is that,
because any given individual shareholder can bring suit on behalf of the corporation, those
in positions of power will have a check on abusive behavior. See Zhong Zhang, The
Shareholder Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in China: Why the Excitement
is Actually for Nothing, 28 PAC. BASIN L.J. 174, 175 (2011).
216. See Hale, supra note 5, at 4.
217. See Seo, supra note 34, at 31-37.
218. See id. at 39.
219. See id. “Horizontal” refers to businesses spanning different industries, whereas
“vertical” refers to businesses spanning different levels of the same supply chain. See Evan
Tarver, Horizontal vs. Vertical Integration: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 18,
2021), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/051315/what-difference-betweenhorizontal-integration-and-vertical-integration.asp [https://perma.cc/5879-Q935].
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control bloc considers how to use the whole conglomerate to
maximize its own profits, often expropriating the investments of
minority shareholders and firm profits to support affiliate firms
rather than paying dividends.220 It can cultivate an “internal capital
market,”221 realizing benefits by diverting resources from one
affiliate to another, diversifying risk through its broad portfolio of
industries, and acting on a greater wealth of information given its
involvement across sectors. It also has a lesser interest in
maximizing the cash flow of any particular firm because its overall
ownership stake is quite low. Instead, it prefers to capitalize not
only on profitable projects, but on projects that might enhance its
intangible value, such as having the influence and prestige of being
a large, controlling conglomerate in the national economy.222 Other
minority shareholders, on the other hand, have less flexibility and
tend to bear the cost of the control bloc’s expropriation.223
Outside shareholders remain unable to advocate for their own
rights even while possessing voting shares, as their votes only
make a substantial impact in extraordinary cases requiring a
supermajority shareholder vote.224 This feeling of irrelevance in
corporate decision-making aggravates general collective action
challenges to result in frequent rubber-stamping at annual
shareholder meetings.225 Even shareholders who may be
interested in having a voice lack the regulatory resources to pursue
their monitoring function, as high minimum holding requirements
for most shareholder rights, a reluctance by insiders to become
whistleblowers, and the absence of thorough discovery impede
shareholders in gaining the information and motivation they might
need to pursue derivative suits or private actions against directors
and management.226 The availability of derivative suits is also
limited by other substantial hurdles; South Korea follows the loser220. See Hale, supra note 5, at 14.
221. See Song, supra note 22, at 205.
222. See id. at 206.
223. See id. at 201.
224. See Seo, supra note 34, at 57. Such decisions include the removal of directors or
statutory auditors, mergers with another company, and capital reduction, among others.
See Lee & Ko, In Brief: Shareholder Rights and Powers in South Korea, LEXOLOGY (June 12,
2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a84c3662-a0ff-4409-aa8257219705f001 [https://perma.cc/PM2F-2E3G].
225. See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 297.
226. See id. at 306; Song, supra note 22, at 213-14.
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pays rule227 and requires the shareholder to put collateral as
security for potential litigation costs.228
Institutional investors, while potentially in a better position
to engage in monitoring due to their larger ownership stakes,229
still fail to engage in effective direct monitoring. Institutions
themselves often lack adequate internal governance structures,
and many remain under the influence of the government or are
within the cross-ownership affiliate structure of the chaebol
firms.230 There also existed a shadow voting regulation during the
Asian Financial Crisis, which restricted financial institutions to
voting only in proportion to the votes of the other shareholders in
attendance.231 This meant that banks effectively contributed only
to the quorum requirement and were unable to use their larger
ownership stakes to influence the decisions of management.232
Finally, hostile takeovers233 have been historically difficult in
South Korea. They were initially barred outright;234 and later, after

227. The loser-pays rule requires the losing party to reimburse the winning party for
legal expenses, including attorneys’ fees. See Marie Gryphon, Greater Justice, Lower Cost:
How a “Loser Pays” Rule Would Improve the American Legal System, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE
3
(Dec.
1,
2008),
https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr_11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/487T-B7C7].
228. See Song, supra note 22, at 213-14; Kwon, Internal Division, supra note 171, at
314.
229. See Song, supra note 22, at 215.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 215-16 (“For example, if the shareholders attending the general
meeting, other than the financial institutions, vote 30% (for) vs. 70% (against), the
institutional shareholders should also vote their shares 30% (for) vs. 70% (against).”).
While this rule was never formally included in any statute—it was located in the “Guidance
on Management of Trusted Fund,” issued by the Finance and Economic Ministry—banks
nonetheless adhered to it due to the obedient relationship between banks and the
government. See id. at 215 n.106. Thus, it was never officially repealed; rather, in 2017,
banks were given affirmative permission to vote their shares in the Securities Investment
Trust Business Act. See id. at 245 n.140; Interview with Young Su Shin & Hyung Ki Lee,
Public Mergers and Acquisitions in South Korea: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS 3 (Oct. 1,
2020),
https://content.next.westlaw.com/2-5021572?__lrTS=20210213162521171&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&
firstPage=true [https://perma.cc/Y8KC-W7V8].
233. A hostile takeover involves the acquirer company buying up shares in the target
company or campaigning to place acquirer-friendly directors and officers into the
company. See Akhilesh Ganti, Hostile Takeover, INVESTOPEDIA (May 15, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hostiletakeover.asp [https://perma.cc/WP2U3CA8].
234. See Kim, Living with the IMF, supra note 50, at 76.
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this ban was removed from Korean statutory law, chaebol firms
remained protected from hostile takeovers through the statutory
ten percent ownership cap.235 Today, shareholders remain
insulated from hostile takeover attempts through their crossshareholding; in aggregate, they often possess roughly forty
percent of outstanding voting shares through their affiliates,
requiring a potential bidder to acquire nearly all of the remaining
shares in order to gain power.236 Such a prohibitively steep
requirement makes hostile takeovers almost impossible.
b. Failure of Reforms to Protect Minority Shareholders
i. Enhanced Shareholder Rights
Korean legislators have implemented numerous measures
aimed at increasing the rights of minority shareholders and
improving these shareholders’ ability to monitor the chaebol
families. The main mechanism has been expanded shareholder
rights. Reforms include shareholder proposal rights,237 cumulative
and proxy voting,238 the repeal of the shadow voting rule, access to
corporate information, fiduciary duties for controlling
shareholders, and clear penalties and remedies for wrongdoing.239
235. This cap applies to all shareholders—founding families and would-be raiders
alike. While serving to limit the direct ownership of any one controlling shareholder, it is
easily circumvented through chaebol families’ cross-ownership structures using affiliates.
Therefore, it serves only to entrench these families, as it both allows controlling blocks to
exist while prohibiting takeover attempts. See Seo, supra note 34, at 43.
236. See Song, supra note 22, at 211.
237. Shareholders may submit proposals at annual shareholder meetings to be voted
on. See Scott Lesmes, Frequently Asked Questions About Shareholder Proposals and Proxy
Access, MORRISON & FOERSTER 1 (2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/frequentlyasked-questions-about-shareholder-proposals-and-proxy-access.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GR6M-78Y5].
238. Cumulative voting allows a shareholder to use all of her votes on one nominee
(ordinarily, a shareholder may only cast one vote per nominee). This enables minority
shareholders to have greater influence in electing directors. See Cumulative Voting,
INVESTOR.GOV (last visited Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/glossary/cumulative-voting [https://perma.cc/5XLU-SFPX].
Proxy voting allows shareholders to consent to other shareholders voting on their behalf
at shareholder meetings. Because a requirement that all shareholders must attend the
meeting in order to vote might deter many shareholders from voting, proxy voting enables
a greater portion of shareholders’ opinions to be considered in decision-making. See
Lesmes, supra note 237, at 15.
239. See Song supra note 22, at 224-25; Black et al., supra note 14, at 557-58; Kim,
Living with the IMF, supra note 50, at 73; Ehrlich & Kang, Remaining Issues, supra note 170,
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The minimum ownership requirements to exercise some of these
rights (namely shareholder proposals and filing derivative suits)
were also reduced, thus making them more accessible to investors
other than the largest institutional shareholders.240
Although these new rights and expanded recourse are
certainly welcome changes, their efficacy relies on shareholders’
willingness to engage in activism.241 This interest appears low; for
example, shareholder proposals are utilized at only one to two
percent of public firms.242 This may be because Korean tradition
tends to dictate a preference for informal, private remedies outside
of the public eye. Additionally, the collective action issue remains
at large public firms, where each shareholder holds only a small
percentage of shares, while the firm remains under the effective
control of the chaebol family.243
ii. Availability of Hostile Takeovers
Policymakers have abolished the original ban on hostile
takeovers and the subsequent limitations on ownership.244 In
1998, leaders also eliminated tender offer provisions that required
would-be raiders intending to acquire more than twenty-five
percent of outstanding shares of a listed company to make a tender
offer for more than fifty percent of the company’s shares.245
However, raiders still face significant challenges in completing
successful hostile takeovers and therefore shareholders struggle to
realize the benefits that such attempts might bring.246 While the
law may have changed, culture may still act as a powerful

at 10. For details on shareholder proposal rights, see Hye-Sung Kim, Corporate Elections
and Shareholder Proposal Rights: From Case Studies in South Korea, 7 E. ASIA L. REV. 257,
263-66 (2012) [hereinafter Kim, Corporate Elections].
240. See Song, supra note 22, at 225.
241. See Black et al., supra note 14, at 557.
242. See Kim, Corporate Elections, supra note 239, at 274.
243. See Song, supra note 22, at 196-202.
244. See Ehrlich & Kang, Remaining Issues, supra note 170.
245. See Song, supra note 22, at 226.
246. These benefits include, for example, shareholder-friendly incentives like special
dividends that current management would typically offer to induce shareholders to reject
such takeover attempts. See Adam Hayes, What Happens to the Target Company’s Shares in
(Mar.
17,
2021),
a
Hostile
Takeover,
INVESTOPEDIA
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042215/what-happens-shares-companyhas-been-object-hostile-takeover.asp [https://perma.cc/C76V-8H6X].
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impediment; hostile takeovers may remain antithetical to
traditional Korean values.247
iii. Access to Derivative Suits
Legislators have since amended the KCC to reduce the
ownership stake requirement for derivative and direct suits to one
percent,248 while the Korean Securities and Exchange Act has a .01
percent ownership requirement of shares held for at least six
months since the time of filing for derivative suits.249 Neither code
requires that the shareholder actively be holding those shares at
the time of filing.250 These amendments have greatly expanded the
availability for current and previous shareholders to bring suits
against their respective corporations and directors.
However, these ownership stake requirements remain
difficult to meet, given the highly dispersed ownership between
non-controlling shareholders.251 Further, under the KCC, even
shareholders who fulfill the ownership requirement must first
attempt a resolution with the corporation before going to the
courts.252 Additionally, shareholders are still required to post
security to cover defendants’ expenses, and any recovery is
awarded to the corporation itself. The only direct benefit a
shareholder stands to gain through a derivative suit is
reimbursement for legal fees.253 As a result, many shareholders
may still find insufficient incentives to bring derivative suits.254
247. See Ehrlich & Kang, Remaining Issues, supra note 170 (Samsung’s attempted
takeover of Kia in 1993 was “condemned as clashing with Korean values” and
subsequently abandoned). More recently, South Korean attorneys affirmed that there are
still “negative sentiments” about hostile takeovers. Shin & Lee, supra note 232.
248. See Kwon, Internal Division, supra note 171, at 315.
249. See Hee-Chul Kang, Seoul High Court Allows Double Derivative Suit; Supreme
L.
OFF.
(Nov.
17,
2003),
Court
May
Not,
INT’L
https://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Corporate-Commercial/SouthKorea/Woo-Yun-Kang-Jeong-Han/Seoul-High-Court-Allows-Double-Derivative-SuitSupreme-Court-May-Not [https://perma.cc/5LJ7-VEQ4].
250. See id.
251. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 677 (“Only institutional shareholders can feasibly
bring a derivative suit against most mid- and large-cap companies. This rule is not
egalitarian and shuts the courthouse doors to all retail investors.”).
252. See Kwon, Internal Division, supra note 171, at 315.
253. See id. at 316.
254. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 670, 677-78 (“Unless fundamental changes in the
structure of incentives are made, notwithstanding a few quixotic actions each year, Korea
permits derivative suits in name only.”).
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iv. Limitations on Affiliate Voting Rights
As previously discussed, chaebol firms quickly circumvented
the old restriction on affiliate voting rights by building complex
ownership structures.255 Recognizing the abuses of this crossownership structure, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
(“MRFTA”) has since 1998 restricted affiliate voting rights and
thereby given more voice to non-controlling shareholders.256
Based on these new restrictions, non-bank financial institution
(“NBFI”) votes can only be exercised in aggregate up to fifteen
percent, and chaebol families cannot use more than twenty-five
percent of their assets in acquiring257 or possessing more than a
twenty-five percent ownership stake in affiliate stocks.258
However, the MRFTA offers lenient exceptions to these
requirements,259 and many financial and insurance affiliates are
exempted.260 Using these loopholes, chaebol firm affiliate
ownership has never dipped below the twenty-five percent
threshold,261 and they continue to utilize exempt firms to
“rearrange their cross-shareholdings and channel their voting
rights through more non-financial firms to comply with the
limit.”262 They also continue to utilize their political strength to
lobby against further regulations on cross-ownership—
regulations that might seriously hamper chaebol families’
control—arguing that such regulations would make their national
flagship firms susceptible to foreign takeovers.263

255. See supra Section II.C.
256. See Hale, supra note 5, at 40.
257. See id.
258. See Seo, supra note 34, at 60-61.
259. See id. at 64-65 (“[C]haebol companies are allowed to own other companies’
shares to the extent that such ownership will enhance the international competitiveness
of the industry or facilitate corporate restructuring.”).
260. Financial and insurance companies are exempted because they are regulated by
other (less strict) laws. See Hale, supra note 5, at 38.
261. See Seo, supra note 34, at 65.
262. Hale, supra note 5, at 40; see also Seo, supra note 34, at 65 (“[M]any chaebol
affiliates could jointly invest less than their 25% of net assets in a new venture. This joint
investment would not violate the rules in the MRFTA, but would further complicate the
interlocking web of shareholding among subsidiaries.”).
263. See Hale, supra note 5, at 40-41.
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The Role of Soft Social Controls

Finally, soft social controls both increase accountability and
impede the effectiveness of shareholder reforms. Most beneficial is
the Confucian emphasis placed on reputation. Chaebol families
recognize the value of a positive reputation; much of their political
strength has come from their image as integral to and champions
of the modern Korean economy.264 As such, to maintain these
reputations, they must—at least to some extent—limit the abuses
of their cross-shareholding structures.265 Additionally, to the
extent that conglomerate chairmen perceive the conglomerate and
the employees within it as an extension of the family structure,
they may work to cultivate the good of the conglomerate and
hesitate to extract private benefits that are detrimental to its
members.266
The efficacy of these soft social controls is limited, however,
by the absence of the concept of shareholder primacy in Korean
culture. Directors are meant to owe their duties to the corporation
as a whole, not to any individual shareholder,267 but this
“abstraction . . . has not taken deep root in Korean corporate
governance.”268 Rather than internalizing their loyalty to the
corporation, or to shareholders generally, directors remain allied
to one specific shareholder or group of shareholders—the
controlling family.269 Furthermore, although the preservation of
one’s reputation might control chairman behavior, Korean culture
values private resolution and compromise over public litigation
and ensuing scandal.270 Combined with the general scarcity of
investigative journalism in South Korea,271 chaebol chairmen can
keep their personal abuses of the conglomerate private, and thus
face no risk to their public reputations.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra Part II.
See Seo, supra note 34, at 58.
See id. (“[A] chaebol is still regarded as a proxy of a family.”).
See Rhee, supra note 7, at 680.
Id. at 702.
See id.
See supra, Section III.B.
See Kim, Daewoo, supra note 25, at 335-36.
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2. Banks and Other Creditors
Since Korea’s initial industrialization in the 1960s, banks have
separated from the government and many now have Western
directors sitting on their boards.272 Improvement in monitoring
remains hampered, however, by the state’s continuous
involvement in the financial sector. The government still appoints
CEOs of banks and banks still make many secured loans without
sufficient credit analysis.273 Banks continue to disregard future
profitability and risk of investment when making loans both
because of this influence, as well as because their loans are secured
by collateral or guarantees; thus, they fail to execute sufficient
monitoring and exercise little to no control until borrower
bankruptcy.274
D.

Why Chaebol Firms Persist

The ever-present influence of Confucian culture exacerbates
the inefficacies of many of these reforms. Generally speaking, it is
difficult to ask directors, shareholders, or other members of a
chaebol conglomerate to speak out and voice concerns when
culture continues to normalize the suppression of conflicting ideas
and perpetuation of hierarchical social structures.275 Even as older
directors and managers age out, it is unlikely that the new
generation will successfully change the traditional business
structure; the Korean education system, from which these new,
young professionals are emerging, continues to value rote
memorization, respect for seniority, and other traditional
Confucian values.276
Furthermore, in light of these social and business structures,
the chaebol system “has remained durable not in spite of
inefficiencies, but because of them in the sense that inefficiency
and legitimate interest are inextricably intertwined . . . The
peculiar Korean system exists because [dynastic families and the
government] share a common interest,”277 and chaebol firms’
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See Ehrlich & Kang, U.S. Style Corporate Governance, supra note 179, at 62.
See Song, supra note 22, at 218.
See id. at 219.
See Ehrlich & Kang, Remaining Issues, supra note 170.
See id.
Rhee, supra note 7, at 686.
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longevity may represent a true combined effort to benefit the
public good.
The mutually beneficial relationship between chaebol firms
and the government was the main mechanism by which Korea
industrialized in the first place.278 Thus, in the modern day, the
Korean government continues to show leniency to chaebol
families. While the government has placed sanctions or criminal
inquiries against the chaebol families, those measures are typically
followed by light penalties or presidential pardons.279 This is due
to the public perception of these firms as integral to the national
economy, and out of respect for the firms’ historical contributions
to Korea’s growth.280
Furthermore, Korean nationalism places a premium on the
importance of Korean control over flagship firms.281 Although
regulations that allow for chaebol family control render monitors
ineffective,282 they also ensure these firms remain in control of
Korean nationals. This may be an acceptable compromise; Koreans
would rather retain their economic powerhouses than allow
foreign investors to take over in pursuit of abstract promises of
increasing transparency.283 Although inefficient, this system of
government-driven economic growth—which has, despite its
flaws, given South Korea the means to flourish economically—
remains preferable to an unknown, unpredictable, and “complex
market of innumerable private actors, each acting under private
incentives with no obligation owed to public interests—i.e., the
American model.”284
VI. MODERN-DAY CHAEBOL FIRMS
A.

Overview

Today, chaebol families only own roughly one percent of the
economic rights of all chaebol firms, yet still retain significant

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See supra Section II.A-B.
See Rhee, supra note 7, at 691.
See id. at 691-92.
See id.
See, e.g., supra Section V.C-D.
See Rhee, supra note 7, at 694.
Id. at 698.
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control over the key corporate groups285—and therefore the
national economy.286 Because these few conglomerates dominate
the economy, industry remains undiversified and chaebol firms are
able to direct the country’s “production, employment, and
economic prospect[s].”287 In the early 2000s, the top thirty chaebol
firms accounted for forty-five percent of Korea’s corporate assets,
forty percent of sales, and twenty percent of employment.288 Korea
suffers from an “inverted” shareholder problem, where minority
shareholders (the founder families) with sharp disparities
between ownership stake and control can silence the voices of
other minority shareholders.289
Internally, the chaebol structure has not improved much since
its inception. The founder family still dominates top managerial
positions (and are often shareholders themselves),290 and the
conglomerate continues to be led by the chairman, the patriarch of
the family.291 The chairman is surrounded by his executive council
in an entity known as the chairman’s office, which coordinates
among affiliates and sets long-term business strategies for the
firm.292
Externally, in addition to preferential treatment from banks,
Korean firms also have considerable influence over non-bank
financial institutions NBFIs. Historically, these institutions offered
interests rates much higher than those offered at government
banks, which were subject to regulation, and soon overtook
traditional banks in popularity among chaebol firms.293 Chaebol
firms obtained ownership stakes in these NBFIs and continue to
use their influence to offer cheap financing to their subsidiaries
and affiliates.294 Likewise, the government has not shifted much
from its historical role; even as it passes formal statutory reform,
it does not fully embrace the ideals behind rigorous corporate
285. Including, for example, electronics, real estate, biological products, and
automobiles. See id.
286. See id. at 668.
287. Id.
288. See Hale, supra note 5, at 27.
289. Rhee, supra note 7, at 662.
290. See Kim, Living with the IMF, supra note 50, at 67.
291. See Ehrlich & Kang, Remaining Issues, supra note 170.
292. See id.; Ehrlich & Kang, U.S. Style Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 23-24.
293. See Hale, supra note 5, at 30.
294. Id.
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governance and has even encouraged affiliates to “rescue” other
conglomerate members in times of financial distress.295
B.

Impact on the Economy

The failings of the firms and of the government have resulted
in the “Korea discount,”296 the manifestation of the general distrust
of Korean firms abroad. The capital market reflects Korea’s
notoriously poor corporate governance practices through a heavy
discount, by which Korean firms are valued at forty-six percent and
twenty-nine percent of their American and Japanese counterparts,
respectively. They also trade at 0.8x price-to-book, meaning that
the market believes firms’ assets will lose, rather than gain, value
in the hands of current management.297 The discount first
manifested in the 1990s and persists today—reflecting foreign
investors’ skepticism of Korean firms, despite the slew of recent
corporate governance reforms.298
This discount has contributed to a vast stratification of social
classes and wealth in Korean society. The personal wealth of the
average Korean lies principally in real estate holdings, which in
Korea are extremely expensive and cannot be acquired without
significant amounts of capital.299 Koreans are unable to perform
well in financial markets, however, because their domestic
corporate entities do not perform well. Average Koreans have
fewer investment options, and therefore have fewer options to
gain capital and attain class mobility. Social classes remain fixed
and barriers high.300
VII. THE PATH FORWARD
The challenges associated with reform in Korea indicate that,
while statutory changes are certainly necessary to produce an
effective corporate governance system, they are insufficient to
create lasting change due to challenges with enforcement. Without
a compatible cultural base on which to implement these reforms,
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Licht, supra note 20, at 214.
Hale, supra note 5, at 41; Rhee, supra note 7, at 681-83.
Rhee, supra note 7, at 681-83.
See Choi & Kim, supra note 133, at 284; Rhee, supra note 7, at 652.
See Rhee, supra note 7, at 683-85.
Id.
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improvements in the Korean system beyond superficial
convergence with Western “best practices” are unlikely. Given that
business culture and law developed in large part as an extension of
pre-existing cultural traditions in Korea, successful reform to the
law and increased compliance must similarly be developed with a
careful consideration of culture.301
“[I]nformal institutions and cultural norms bridge the gap
between formal legal institutions and the judicial system.”302
Rather than wholesale importation from Western countries,
regulations should instead be reformed to suit traditional Korean
values. This will help incentivize bureaucrats and the corporate
elite to truly embrace the spirit of the law—rather than comply
only formally—and bring substantive convergence between the
Korean model and the American model, allowing the two schools
of thought to “meet in the middle.” “In principle, if incentives are
correctly set, [Korean regulators] can uphold Confucian values and
still maximize shareholder wealth—'[e]ven Confucian managers
respond to incentives.’”303
This Part will explore the various ways in which this shift can
be implemented. Section A discusses changes in corporate culture,
Section B details possible statutory and administrative reforms,
Section C proposes greater market regulation, and Section D
highlights the potential role of NGOs and public activism. These
methods of change have in the past successfully effected change in
Korean governance304 and could be similarly effective to cure the
defects discussed above. Section E notes, however, that the
challenges to change remain stark, and Korea may see only slow
and formal change until some catalyst acts as the “breaking point”
for the Korean people.
A.

Corporate Culture: Change from the Top Down

Although Confucian norms can be considered responsible for
many of the inefficiencies and abuses of the chaebol system, they
are not inherently negative. Confucian values of the public good,

301.
302.
303.
304.

See Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 98.
Id. at 30.
Licht, supra note 20, at 216 (quoting Black et al., supra note 14, at 545).
See, e.g., supra Part V.
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mutual respect, and morality305 can encourage behaviors that
benefit society as a whole. Confucianism also espouses modifying
one’s thoughts based on new moral education.306 It is, therefore,
wholly compatible with the possibility of modifying the role that
chaebol firms can play in the public sphere.
For a cultural shift to be successful, it must occur through all
levels of business; given the Korean hierarchical culture, this is
only possible if the change moves from the top, down.307 Therefore,
change must first be instilled in the chaebol leaders, who set the
tone for the corporate culture throughout their conglomerates.
Korean culture “emphasizes the concept of one’s reputation and
honor;” therefore, the social stigma associated with public
exposure of corruption or bad business judgment could have a
deterrent effect on chairmen.308 This goal could perhaps be
effected through greater investigative journalism or heightened
audit requirements upon firms.
Chairmen may also be convinced by the argument that the
“promot[ion of] trust, ethics, and good compliance practices . . . [is]
positively correlated with business success, and companies with a
strong and sustainable culture of voluntary compliance of all levels
can derive substantial value from their compliance efforts.”309 This
stance both promotes accountability and appeals to chairmen’s
desires to maximize their personal benefits; while their ownership
stakes may remain small and they would not gain as much from
profit-based success as other shareholders might, they would
stand to gain in reputation and other “soft” profits if their
conglomerates become well-known both for profitability and for
accountability and high levels of employee trust. Chaebol leaders
may be more open to this mutually beneficial conception of
corporate governance, and “when a business actor achieves . . .
‘sympathetic understanding’ of the law,” he “internaliz[es those]
norms . . . as part of his or her identity.”310

305. See supra Section III.A.
306. See Ma & Marquis, Business Culture, supra note 6, at 42.
307. See Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 79.
308. Daniel Y. Jun, Bribery Among the Korean Elite: Putting an End to a Cultural Ritual
and Restoring Honor, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1071, 1107 (1996).
309. Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 79.
310. Id. at 75 (quoting John Galgay, Corporate Plans and Policies for Voluntary
Antitrust Compliance, 19 BUS. LAW 637, 641 (1964)).
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Additionally, the mandatory appointment of chief compliance
and ethics officers (“CCOs”) with a truly meaningful role in the
improvement of corporate governance within firms could
spearhead a cultural shift throughout these firms. Confucian
paternalism could be invoked by CCOs to encourage directors and
managers to have greater regard for corporate social
responsibility;311 given their role as elite members of Korean
society and the unique influence they have over the government
and the economy,312 the highest form of moral Confucianism they
could pursue would be advancement of the public good. This
mindset could elicit greater transparency and accountability
among the chaebol leaders, as they come to see themselves as
stewards and benefactors of the Korean public.313
Finally, Confucian doctrines can also be applied at all levels of
staff to encourage moral and social responsibility and accentuate
the importance of the corporation as a whole acting as a “good
corporate citizen.” “[E]mpiricists suggest [that] creating identity
between the values of the company and the values of its employees,
and making ethical rules and boundaries credible” are vital to the
cultivation of good compliance norms within a business.314 General
staff members may feel inclined to adopt this change in mindset
after seeing management at higher levels adopt it themselves.
CCOs might also work to encourage such a firmwide shift in
thought through opportunities for continued education for staff
and management and through regular meetings with independent
board members to ensure impartial judgment on the results of
such training.315 They could build support for the training among
upper management by reminding officers of the positive
correlation between firm success, a trusting firmwide culture,
voluntary compliance.

311. Ma & Marquis, Business Culture, supra note 6, at 41.
312. See supra Section III.A.2-3.
313. See Ma & Marquis, Business Culture, supra note 6, at 41.
314. Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 93-94.
315. These directors could form committees similar to American audit committees,
which must be comprised of independent directors and which are subject to regular
review to ensure their independence. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(a) (2006).
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Statutory and Administrative Reforms

With an adjustment of corporate culture, statutory and
administrative regulation may finally be effective if similarly
adjusted to conform to traditional Korean values. “[A]pproaches to
competition law and policy . . . have to be shaped and implemented
in ways that respond intelligently to these cultural factors.”316
“Korean reformers could devise better corporate governance that
draws on the country’s huge social capital that its cultural
endowment embodies.”317
1. Statutory Reforms
Korea’s export-oriented capitalism makes its economic
system “less autonomous and more volatile,” and makes “legalist
styles” of governance less effective.318 As such, it tends not to
benefit from the wholesale import of statutes from juristic systems
(like the United States), and would instead benefit more from a
political system of regulation.319 This would require, however, less
interdependence between policymakers and chaebols. Rather than
a direct import, a revised regulatory framework should simply
borrow general principles of corporate governance from Western
codes. Regulations should then be tailored towards Korean
traditions, focusing more on incentives for compliance than on
punishments for violations or reliance on litigation for
enforcement. For example, Article 382 of the KCC currently
attempts to enforce “good” firm behavior through penalties for

316. Ma & Marquis, Business Culture, supra note 6, at 6.
317. Licht, supra note 20, at 232.
318. Michael W. Dowdle, On the Public-Law Character of Competition Law: A Lesson
from Asian Capitalism, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 301, 345-46 (2015).
319. The juristic system is characterized by a general alignment between judicial
decision-making and a particular set of founding principles and heavily utilizes “politically
‘independent’ regulatory agencies” (consider, for example, the American system, with an
active judiciary and extensive use of administrative agencies). It is ineffective, however, in
systems with no united set of principles. In its stead, the political system attempts to weigh
and manage different regulatory goals, with the legislative government heavily involved in
every aspect of regulatory activity. Id. at 356. In South Korea—a young country with a civil
law system thrust forcefully into modernization—the juristic system is a poor fit; its
principles and statutes cannot effectively be imported. Instead, the government must step
in to manage the many divergent interests, and good corporate governance practices must
be embraced by bureaucrats, who can work to implement them as regulators in a political
system.
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non-compliance, meant to act as deterrents.320 This has proved
ineffective;321 thus, firm behavior could instead be influenced
through fine reductions or immunization conditioned upon goodfaith efforts to comply with regulations. While traditional
punishments would still exist for infractions, this incentive-based
system could better drive firm behavior.322
Statutes should continue providing clear requirements for
director (and de facto director)323 duties of loyalty and care. Korea
is sorely lacking in a fairness assessment when analyzing breaches
of fiduciary duty. In the United States, this involves the use of a twoprong assessment: fair price and fair dealing. This allows courts
greater flexibility in assessing self-dealing disputes, allowing for
case-by-case determination.324 Adding one directly into the KCC to
work alongside Articles 388, 397, and 398—which currently
provide for director fiduciary duties325—would increase director
incentives to consider overall shareholder value, rather than
simply the wishes of the controlling bloc, when making
decisions.326 The fairness requirement could operate similarly to
the good-faith analysis considered above.
Additionally, although the deterrent effect as embodied in
laws and regulations has not been particularly useful in the past, it
could be improved by increasing possibilities for personal liability
in the event of breaches of the duty of loyalty.327 Doing so could
help to decrease instances of self-interested behaviors by
chairmen, de facto directors, as it may force them to internalize
costs that they were previously able to externalize to minority
shareholders. For other directors, the risk of personal liability
could counter feelings of allegiance and duty to the controlling
320. See, e.g., supra Section V.B.1.b.
321. See supra Section V.B.1.b.
322. See Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 97.
323. See supra Section V.B.1.b.
324. See Kwon, Corporate Governance, supra note 179, at 11.
325. Id. at 8.
326. See Black et al., supra note 14, at 576.
327. This could namely be accomplished through the codifying of the common law
concepts behind Delaware fiduciary duties, for example requiring directors to prove that
they are fully disinterested when exercising their business judgment. See Peter Atkins,
Marc Gerber, Edward Micheletti & Robert Saunders, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Back to
(Feb.
19,
2020),
Delaware
Law
Basics,
SKADDEN
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/02/directors-fiduciary-duties
[https://perma.cc/JR6K-NCGD].

2021]

TAMING THE BEAST

203

shareholder and instead shift their priorities to generating general
shareholder value.328
Finally, rather than the .01 percent rule for derivative suits,329
Article 191-13 of the KCC could be amended to reflect a monetary
minimum investment rule. The .01 percent rule exists to prevent
companies from illegitimate or baseless suits, but is also so
restrictive that it essentially eliminates all possibility of derivative
suits. Instead, a monetary amount of investment could be chosen—
Rhee suggests 50 million Won, for example.330 Such a number
could create accessibility for sophisticated shareholders, while still
excluding most, and would compound the general inconvenience
of litigation, thus discouraging frivolous suits. “The well-to-do
retail shareholder, who is not misguided, would serve well as a
private monitor of the worst abuses.”331 He would not face the
same constraints as an elite investor who shares social circles with
chaebol families, an institutional shareholder which chaebol
families have historically influenced, or a retail investor who might
lack expertise or sophistication.
When considering any further statutory reforms or
convergence with the American model of corporate governance, it
is important to remember that statutes remain the least effective
way to create change in Korean corporate governance. Even with
cultural and educational reform, it remains unlikely that chaebol
firms would cease circumventing regulations and willingly lose
their political and economic influence gained through corruption.
As such, policymakers and other investors must work to
strengthen themselves against chaebol lobbying. This could be
accomplished by diversifying investments and better
compensating policymakers to minimize their dependence on
chaebol families.
2. Administrative Reforms
Administrative reform is also required to ensure that
government officials tasked with enforcing new regulations are
properly equipped with the skills to do so.332 Consultation of
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Rhee, supra note 7, at 706.
See supra, Section V.C.1.b.iii.
See Rhee, supra note 7, at 705.
See id. at 706.
See Marquis & Ma, supra note 9, at 60.
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economic experts and academics when considering economic
policy should become a norm, and consultants’ reports should be
made public to increase transparency and accountability.333 The
recruiting system for government officials, including judges,
should also be reformed, placing less priority on the civil service
examination334 and more on technical competence. Doing so could
help reduce the groupthink that often results from similar
educational backgrounds and prevent personal or political bias
from entering the government.335
In order to achieve this shift, a modification of the education
system of Korea may also be needed. The traditional Confucian
style of classroom teaching—involving rote memorization rather
than innovation and ingenuity—is likely incompatible with a truly
effective system of corporate governance,336 as it only encourages
hierarchical social structures and discourages conflict. The success
of creating such a widespread change requires reform in Korean
business education—Western styles of teaching could be imported
into Korean universities, perhaps through the employment of
foreign professors. Young Korean scholars should be encouraged
to think of creative solutions and to challenge pre-existing
customs, rather than to follow blindly the customs of the
generations prior. Thus, when these new academics enter the
business field, either as government bureaucrats or as employees
at a chaebol firm, they may find success in importing their new
modes of thought and values. For this strategy to work, however, it
must occur concurrently with re-education within the firms
themselves; if these efforts are not simultaneous, new hires may
find their voices silenced by the authoritarian culture of the firms.
3. Shareholder Activism: The National Pension System
The National Pension Service (“NPS”) acts on behalf of the
public and is the largest single shareholder in South Korea.337 It is
generally viewed positively among both Korean elites and the
general population and wields a great deal of influence over
corporate affairs. It currently resides in the Ministry of Health and
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See id.
See supra, Section III.A.1.
See Marquis & Ma, supra note 9, at 66.
See Ma & Marquis, Corporate Culture, supra note 73, at 91-94.
See Rhee, supra note 7, at 708.
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Welfare and has had its own instances of corruption; 338 it also
tends to side with management in shareholder disputes. 339
This does not, however, preclude the possible benefits that
the NPS can have on Korean corporate governance. Given its
prominent financial role, its internal governance could be moved
to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, where it could then benefit
from the influence of officials knowledgeable in economics and
industrial strategy. More critically, it is vastly simpler to reform a
single organization than the financial system as a whole. If the NPS
could be staffed with officials committed to enhanced minority
shareholder rights and improved governance, it could serve as a
voice for the masses of unaffiliated shareholders, vote “with an eye
toward [systemic] efficiency,”340 and spearhead derivative actions.
The NPS could act as a monitor over many chaebol firms and take
on an activist role in the improvement of corporate governance
nationwide. “Reform can be surgical with global effects.”341
C.

Market Regulation

1. Evidence of Market Regulation
External market regulation could also contribute to improved
corporate governance in South Korea. Given the growing
globalization of world capital markets, chaebol firms are facing
increasing pressure both to list on foreign exchanges and to retain
the interest of domestic investors.342 Korean firms interested in
listing on foreign exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange are
often forced to improve their corporate governance to meet listing
standards, and these firms may then realize that improved
corporate governance is also necessary to retain domestic
investors.343 Additionally, foreign investors in South Korea could
import a Western influence344 that could help weaken traditional

338. See id.
339. See id. at 709.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 710.
342. See Choi & Kim, supra note 133, at 283.
343. See id.
344. Foreign investors could, for example, use their positions to encourage
shareholder activism among domestic investors, curtailing the passivity perpetuated
among other minority shareholders as a result of Confucian culture.
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cultures of loyalty to controlling shareholders. While this informal
regulation may not serve as a complete substitute for effective
policymaking, it could serve to mitigate problems as the Korean
government works to create a reformed corporate governance
structure.
While market influence has not historically been effective due
to Korean nationalism345 and foreign investor inaction,346 there is
some evidence that the market can influence Korean corporate
behavior.347 Hyundai’s chairman, for example, resigned from his
position following dissatisfaction from investors and creditors.348
While affiliates have typically propped up other “arms” of their
respective conglomerates in times of financial trouble, in the case
of Hyundai, several affiliates refused to bail out the “head,” despite
government attempts to encourage the bailout plan.349 While there
may have been some interpersonal elements at play in the
affiliates’ reluctance to accept financial support,350 several
affiliates specifically identified “their own financial health, their
independence, and the minority shareholders” as reasons for
refusal351—signifying that Korean affiliates are not always
opposed to placing their shareholders over the will of the founder.
In another case, the large Korean conglomerate SK
experienced a sharp drop in stock price after the controlling
shareholder’s illegal behavior and the firms’ accounting fraud and
mismanagement came to light.352 As a result, a foreign investor was
able to become the single largest shareholder with a 14.9 percent
stake and stage a takeover attempt.353 While the investor was
ultimately unable to remove SK’s leader, the attempt forced the
chairman to improve the firm’s corporate governance and to
demand the resignation of all family members except for himself

345. Korean retail investors may prefer investing in Korean firms even if they suffer
from weaker corporate governance.
346. Historically, foreign investors have been ineffective at monitoring Korean
chaebol firms. See Kim, Living with the IMF, supra note 50, at 65.
347. See Craig Ehrlich & Dae Seob Kang, Independence Within Hyundai?, 22 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 709, 712 (2001).
348. See id.
349. See id. at 725.
350. See id.
351. See id. 725-26.
352. See Seo, supra note 34, at 69.
353. See id.
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from SK subsidiary boards in order to rally shareholder support.354
This example illustrates Korean investors’ preference that the
firms remain in Korean hands and that more opportunities for
hostile takeovers will therefore not necessarily result in loss of
Korean ownership to foreign investors. Korean shareholders
appear open to continued chaebol leadership as long as the
chairmen offer improved corporate governance in exchange.
2. A Possible Role for the Korean Stock Exchange
Researchers Stephen Choi and Kon Sik Kim355 posit that the
Korean Stock Exchange could pave the way for Korean market
reform.356 They suggest that the KSE institute a new, optional
market with higher listing standards that would be imposed
through private contract.357 This new market might attract highvalue firms that require more capital and managers of these
companies might be willing to opt into higher corporate
governance standards to reduce their cost of capital. These firms
will also be incentivized to become more attractive to outside
investors and hire professional managers versed in doing so. This
new demand for managers with a high level of technical
competence could contribute to the drive to reform Korean
business schools and alter the internal corporate culture of the
firms themselves. Over time, these heightened corporate
governance standards and increased share values would likely
attract more investors who would come to expect this higher
standard of governance, thus placing pressure on other firms to
migrate to the new market.358

354. See id. at 70.
355. Stephen Choi is a Professor of Law and Business at NYU Law; he received his J.D.
and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University. Stephen Choi, NYU LAW,
http://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid
=23843 [https://perma.cc/BJG8-ASE2]. Kon Sik Kim is a Professor of Law at Seoul
National University School of Law; he received his LL.M. from Harvard University and his
J.D. and Ph.D. from the University of Washington. See Kon Sik Kim, NUS: CENTER FOR ASIAN
STUDIES, https://law.nus.edu.sg/cals/people/kon-sik-kim/ [https://perma.cc/LVJ9MPJQ].
356. Choi & Kim, supra note 133, at 288-98.
357. See id. at 286-88.
358. Id.
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NGOs and Public Activism

Non-governmental organizations can also play an active role
in improving Korean corporate governance. The most active
among them is the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy,
which has successfully spearheaded suits to improve minority
shareholder rights in chaebol firms.359 Its greatest success is its
derivative suit against Samsung, discussed above, which resulted
in five directors compensating Samsung Electronics 62.66 billion
Won.360 Other NGOs could operate in a similar capacity, initiating
derivative suits on behalf of shareholders. The increased use of
derivative suits might then increase both the likelihood of firm
compliance and perhaps encourage shareholders to pursue such
suits themselves.
More generally, over the past decades, Korean citizens have
proven their willingness to engage in political activism, even in the
face of prevailing cultures of collectivism and paternalism. Koreans
are no strangers to outspoken displays of outrage; most recently,
they have come forward in protest of President Park’s corruption
and their parents and grandparents,361 who today are likely the
ones clinging most staunchly to traditional customs, have
themselves cried out against authoritarian rule in the face of
Dictator Park’s militant regime.362 Traditional values of
collectivism may have fueled these movements, as protesters
champion change that they believe will benefit society as a whole.
Korean nationalism, a belief in the overall social good, and
continued cases of chaebol corruption and abuse could inspire an
interest in improved corporate governance among Korean citizens,
which could then prompt policymakers to effect more substantive
change in corporate governance.363

359. See Lee, supra note 15, at 355.
360. See id. at 364-69.
361. See, e.g., S Korea Sees Largest Protests Against President Park Geun Hye, BBC
NEWS
(Nov.
26,
2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38114558
[https://perma.cc/T8PP-YXM9].
362. See Chong-suk Han, Kwangju Uprising, BRITTANICA (last updated May 11, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/event/Kwangju-Uprising [https://perma.cc/JK46-3XJJ].
363. See Rhee, supra note 7, at 706, 715-16.
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The Tipping Point

Great change has historically only occurred in South Korea
after a strong catalyst prompted enough outrage to inspire it.364
While the country may eventually implement new statutes that
both mandate improved corporate governance and also remain
consistent with traditional Confucian norms, widespread
acceptance and implementation of its rules may require yet
another “tipping point”365 for the Korean public. This will likely
occur when the chaebol firms elicit enough scandals to prove to the
public that they are no longer working to advance the national
economy, but rather for personal gain and the gain of their friends
and family members. If such a shift in perception were to occur, it
is unlikely that the corrupt relationship between the government
and chaebol families alone could continue propping up the abusive
system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While it may seem tempting to borrow the best parts of
foreign corporate governance laws when attempting to implement
reforms, such a strategy cannot be effective unless those laws are
modified to suit the particular culture and history into which they
are imported. In Korea, that culture is Confucianism embedded in
a society historically plagued by war and invasion. When
implementing corporate governance reform, borrowing the best
parts of comparable foreign systems can be tempting. Such a
strategy, however, is destined to fail if it ignores the implementing
country’s culture and history. Although the chaebol system may
seem grossly inefficient and antithetical to the principles that
characterize American corporate governance, it developed and
flourished in South Korea in large part because of its compatibility
with Korean values and traditions. While this does not justify the
historical systemic abuse, it suggests that the solution for Korean
corporate governance does not lie with the complete dismantling
and abolishing of the chaebol firms, but rather with reform and
robust regulation. If chaebol leaders could embrace a sense of
responsibility for the stewardship of Korea’s economy, rather than
364. See Choi & Kim, supra note 133, at 286 (discussing “scandal-driven reform”);
supra Section VII.D.
365. Rhee, supra note 7, at 715.
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loyalty to their personal profits, and if policymakers could shed
their interdependencies on those leaders and instead act more
fully on the behalf of the Korean people, Korean society could
utilize the chaebol system in a manner financially beneficial to the
chaebol families, to the members of their conglomerates, and to the
Korean public.

